

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PM-04 INR-07 EB-07 L-03

SSO-00 INRE-00 /049 W
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O 080728Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9004

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 4634

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FOR DRAPER FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS JO US
SUBJECT: ANNUAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUBMISSION

REF: (A) AMMAN 4621, (B) STATE 219129

1. FOLLOWING FORWARDS THE REMAINDER OF OUR SUBMISSION
REQUESTED IN REFTEL.

2. RATIONALE FOR TYPES OF TRAINING COURSES:
AS STATED PARA 6 OF MAP 260700Z JAN 76, "TRAINING
FOR JORDAN ACCOMPLISHES TWO BASIC OBJECTIVES:
(1) AS THE MODEL FOR US WEAPONRY/EQUIPMENT IN THE ARAB
WORLD, IT INSURES THAT JAF WILL MAXIMIZE ITS PROFICIENCY
AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY FOR NEW AND SOPHISTICATED
WEAPONRY AND FACILITIES, AND (2) IT SUPPORTS JAF'S
OBJECTIVES, WHICH COINCIDE WITH US GOVERNMENT
INTERESTS OF MAKING JAF EXPERT IN MIDEAST REGION ON
HANDLING US EQUIPMENT. THIS ALSO HELPS RELIEVE
INCREASING PRESSURE FOR CONUS MILITARY TRAINING BY
VARIOUS STATES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. WITHOUT
MAJOR INCREASES IN GA TRAINING FUNDS, JAF WILL
FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES BECAUSE
THIRD COUNTRY FMS FINANCING IS RARELY AVAILABLE EXCEPT
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FOR HARDWARE PURCHASES." THE FY78 AND 79 TRAINING

PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A STEADY FLOW OF TRAINEES TO CONUS TO EDUCATE SENIOR AND MID-LEVEL OFFICERS IN THEIR CAREER DEVELOPMENT. IN ADDITION, MANY TECHNICAL COURSES ARE NEEDED TO BRING JORDANIAN STANDARDS UP TO US LEVELS IN MAINTENANCE, HOSPITALS, ENGLISH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION LABS, METEOROLOTY, LOGISTICS, COMPUTER SERVICE, FINANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, CARTOGRAPHY, AMMUNITION INSPECTION, AND OTHER FIELDS.

3. LEVELS FOR FY78 AND FY79 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) AD SUPPLY OPERATIONS (PCH&T) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) IMET: FY78--DOLS 1.0 MILLION; FY79--DOLS 1.3 MILLION. INCREASE IN FY79 COSTS ASSUMES HIGHER COST PER STUDENT, WHILE MAINTAINING TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS.

B) SUPPLY OPERATIONS: FY78--DOLS 3.5 MILLION; FY79--DOLS 4.0 MILLION. SUPPLY OPERATIONS LEVELS WILL BE MUCH LOWER THAN ORIGINALLY FORECAST DUE TO FACT THAT EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 76, ALL MAP SHIPMENTS WILL BE BY JORDANIAN FREIGHT FORWARDER WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ITEMS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO BE SHIPPED BY DTS.

4. MAJOR CURRENT OR BILATERAL ISSUES (PARA 2D REF B)

A) MAP/FMS LEVELS:

(1) COMBINED MAP/FMS CREDIT LEVEL OF DOLS 175 MILLION RECOMMENDED BY EMBASSY FOR FY78-79 ESSENTIALLY A STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTION OF TOTAL LEVELS REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN DURING ACTIVE PERIOD OF US MIDEAST DIPLOMACY IN PAST TWO YEARS (WITH INCREASING FMS CREDIT AND DECREASING MAP COMPONENTS PROJECTED FOR FY78-82). THESE LEVELS ARE A FUNCTION OF (A) JORDAN'S NEEDS IN FACE OF HEAVILY ARMED NEIGHBORS, AND (B) POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF FAR LARGER PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL. LATTER POINT MEANS THAT TREND OF FY78-79 JORDAN PROGRAM SHOULD REFLECT SOME PROPORTIONALITY
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TO U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

(2) RECOMMENDED FY78-9 LEVELS ARE ALSO REQUIRED TO SUPPORT U.S. CREDIBILITY TO ARAB WORLD IN ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENT OF U.S. POST-ELECTION MIDEAST ENVIRONMENT. ARABS WILL EXPECT A SIGNIFICANT U.S. SHOW OF INTEREST IN THE MIDEAST FOLLOWING ELECTIONS AND CONTINUATION OF CURRENT LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR ARAB MODERATES. ARABS

WOULD OF COURSE PREFER MOVEMENT TOWARDS AN ACCEPTABLE
SETTLEMENT OF MIDEAST PEACE ISSUE AND WE VIEW PROGRESS
ON THIS ISSUE AS MOST IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT
LEVELS. HOWEVER, CONTINUATION OF U.S. INFLUENCE
THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE MAY BE NEVERTHELESS REQUIRED
TO INDUCE JORDAN TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS THAT AN
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE MOVE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE IN
THE FACE OF PRESSURES FROM RADICAL ARABS.

(3) INDEPENDENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, DANGEROUS
LEBANESE SITUATION AS WELL AS POSSIBLY KUWAITI INTERNAL
SECURITY PROBLEM HAVE POTENTIAL TO ERUPT INTO SERIOUS
INTER-ARAB MILITARY CONFRONTATION. JORDAN ALONG WITH
SYRIA, FACES INCREASED THREAT FROM IRAQ AND RADICAL ARAB
FORCES BECAUSE OF POSITION OF OPPOSING RADICAL ARAB
POSITION ON LEBANESE ISSUE. IN CONCLUSION, UNSTABLE
MIDEAST SITUATION WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE JORDAN TO
MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF ARMAMENT FOR FORESEEABLE
FUTURE, OR ELSE RISK SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ITS
ABILITY TO PLAY A MODERATE ROLE IN MIDEAST.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PM-04 INR-07 EB-07 L-03

SSO-00 INRE-00 /049 W
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O 080728Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9005

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 4634

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FOR DRAPER FROM CHARGE

(4) OUR EMPHASIS ON THIRD-PARTY FINANCED FMS
CREDIT--WITH ITS DIMINISHED REQUIREMENT FOR U.S.
FUNDS--AND ON DECREASING LEVEL OF MAP GRANT IS BASED
ON OUR EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO PROBABLE REDUCED

AVAILABILITY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, WE ASSUME
USG SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE FOR
ISRAEL AND WE FORESEE A SIMILAR REQUIREMENT FOR SOME
LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN TO BUTTRESS ITS MODERATE
STANCE.

B) THIRD-PARTY FINANCED FMS CREDIT:

(1) BASIC RATIONALE FOR THIRD-PARTY FINANCED
FMS CREDIT IT THAT IT IS, GIVEN LIMITED USG FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE RESOURCES, MOST FEASIBLE FINANCIAL MEANS
1) TO PROVIDE JORDAN WITH AN INCREASED MEANS TO APPROACH
THE LEVELS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT ENJOYED BY
ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE AREA (ISRAEL, SYRIA, IRAQ AND
SAUDI ARABIA), AND 2) SATISFYING POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IN LIGHT OF OUR
ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

(2) PROVISION OF FMS CREDIT IS SUBJECT TO
JORDANIAN ABILITY TO FIND FINANCING FROM MUTUALLY
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ACCEPTABLE THIRD PARTIES. EVEN CONSIDERING THE HIGH
LEVELS OF FMS CREDIT INVOLVED IN FY78 AND FY79 WE BELIEVE
THE JORDANIANS HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF ACQUIRING FINANCING FROM
AMONG THE OIL-RICH COUNTRIES. FMS CREDIT, BY SPREADING PAYMENTS
OVER MANY YEARS, HAS POTENTIAL ATTRACTIONS TO OIL-PRODUCING
COUNTRIES FROM BUDGETARY POINT OF VIEW. JORDAN ALSO HAS SOME
POLITICAL LEVERAGE THROUGH ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
TRAINING PROGRAMS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, U.A.E., BAHRAIN AND
QATAR. IT HAS WHAT IT BELIEVES IS A PLEDGE AT 1974 RABAT
CONFERENCE FROM THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES FOR DOLS 175 MILLION
"ANNUALLY" FOR FOUR YEARS. ALTHOUGH FUNDS HAVE NOT
CONTINUED BEYOND INITIAL YEAR, JORDAN MAY BE ABLE TO
DRAW ON THIS ARGUMENT TO ATTRACT FMS CREDIT BACKING.
JORDAN HAS ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH GULF COUNTRIES,
INCLUDING NOW PERHAPS EVEN KUWAIT, AIMED PARTLY AT ACQUIRING
ADDITIONAL FUNDS.

(3) AMMAN 3218 STATES EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
GENERAL POLICY TOWARD USE OF THIS FMS CREDIT UNTIL JORDAN
ACQUIRES THIRD-PARTY GUARANTEES TO FINANCE.

(C) JORDANIAN MILITARY PLANNING:

EMBASSY IS INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING RATIONAL
FORWARD PLANNING REGARDING JORDANIAN MILITARY REQUIRE-
MENTS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, IN LIGHT OF MANPOWER,
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, MADE MORE SIGNIFICANT
BY INTRODUCTION OF HAWK/VULCAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

WE BELIEVE KING HUSSEIN AND JAF ARE BECOMING MORE RECEPTIVE TO MODERATING THEIR EMPHASIS ON ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AS RESULT OF CURRENT PRESSURES ON GOJ BUDGET AND COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FROM THE CIVILIAN SECTOR. IN ADDITION THE JORDANIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NEEDS MORE FUNDS FOR WELL-BEING AND MORALE OF TROOPS.

5. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES:

A) OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS HELPED TO KEEP KING HUSSEIN'S MODERATE VOICE HEARD IN ARAB COUNCILS REGARDING ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES, BECAUSE IT GIVES JORDAN SOME MILITARY CREDIBILITY AS A CONFRONTA-
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TION STATE. IT ALSO HAS GIVEN KING HUSSEIN GREATER SECURITY FROM RADICAL ARAB NEIGHBORS AND ENHANCED HIS POLITICAL POSITION AT HOME. ANY ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS SIMILARLY SHOULD DEMONSTRATE PAYOFF TO ARAB CAUSE OF KING'S MODERATE APPROACH, AND THEY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL SECURITY AND STABILITY OF KING HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT. OBVIOUSLY, CUT OFF OR EVEN SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR JORDAN WITHOUT SIMILAR REDUCTIONS FOR ISRAEL WOULD UNDERMINE KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION IN ARAB WORLD AND INCREASE JORDAN'S VULNERABILITY TO RADICAL ARAB PRESSURES. ANY SIGNIFICANT CUTS IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN REGION AS A WHOLE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY PEACE SETTLEMENT INITIATIVES THAT SHOW U.S. PREPARED TO ADDRESS TOUGH, BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN FINAL SETTLEMENT--E.G., "FINAL" ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL LINES, FUTURE OF EAST JERUSALEM, POLITICAL ROLE OF PALESTINIANS IN MIDDLE EAST.

B) FMS CASH GRANTS TO JORDAN FROM THE OIL-RICH COUNTRIES WOULD OF COURSE BE ONE ALTERNATIVE, IN THE EVENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE. ALTERNATIVE OF SHIFTING TO FULL FMS CASH PROGRAM FROM OIL-RICH STATES WEAKENED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING POSSIBILITY ARAB OIL PRODUCERS WOULD FUND ALL ARMS REQUIREMENTS FOR JORDAN. MORE IMPORTANT, ELIMINATION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE COMMENSURATE LOSS IN U.S. INFLUENCE RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE ARAB STATES. WE WOULD NOT WISH JORDAN TO BE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON ARAB AID BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON JORDAN'S MODERATE POSTURE ON ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE (SINCE EVEN CONSERVATIVE GULF STATES MAY BE SUBJECT TO RADICAL PRESSURES ON THIS ISSUE THAT COULD WELL GO AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS.)

C) ALTHOUGH OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING MODERATE

KING HUSSEIN'S DOMESTIC POSITION COULD BE PARTLY
ADDRESSED THROUGH INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
EFFORTS, PROBLEM OF JORDAN'S MILITARY SECURITY FROM
POTENTIALLY HOSTILE ARAB NEIGHBORS COULD REQUIRE (IN
ABSENCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE) CREDIBLE THIRD-PARTY
OR INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES PERHAPS IN CONTEXT OF
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GUARANTEES SURROUNDING OVERALL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.
SUDDARTH

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